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BATTLE OF THE PRIVILEGES: FIRST AMENDMENT
VS. SIXTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
"Extra! Extra! Read all about it!"
A white racist gang is tried for the murder of a black man and the
savage beating of two other black men! An electrical engineer shoots
four teen-agers who ask him for $5 on a New York subway, and he be-
comes a national folk hero - Berhnard Goetz, the "subway vigilante."
A college dropout strangles an 18-year old woman during a sexual tryst
in New York's Central Park, and it becomes a Big National Story and a
made-for-television movie - "the preppie murder case." A young black
woman says she was kidnapped and sexually abused by a gang of white
racists in Newbourgh, N.Y., and it becomes a national civil rights cause
- the Tawana Brawley case.' The media sensationalizes the individual
defendant under the guise of freedom of the press; the defendant cringes
at the thought of being in the headlines because he fears that prejudice
will taint his right to a fair and impartial trial. Is extensive coverage of
newsworthy defendants infringing upon the defendants' individual
liberties?
In recent years, the media has become a "surrogate for the public." 2
The press is viewed as the guardian against the miscarriage of justice
because it subjects the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to exten-
sive public scrutiny and criticism. However, a defendant's fundamental
right to a fair and impartial trial may conflict with the public's right to
attend the trial. Although a public trial was originally a guarantee of
fairness to the accused,3 the newsworthy defendant is no longer con-
victed by a jury in the courtroom, but rather by the press in the daily
papers.4 What was once envisioned to be a guarantee of impartiality for
the defendant has evolved into a guarantee of prejudice against the
defendant.
1. L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at 1, col. I (valley ed.).
2. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) (citing 6 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 436 (1976)). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 863 (1974) (Powell J. dissenting) (the press as "agent of the public at large.") See gener-
ally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (because individuals have
limited time and resources, they rely on the press to provide them with information about
governmental activity).
3. See infra, Historical Overview at p. 220.
4. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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The constitutional guarantees of free press and public trial both ad-
vocate public access to the governmental process.5 Courts have recog-
nized a century-long rebuttable presumption of open trials6 and have
drawn a balance between the weight accorded to each constitutional
guarantee in favor of a presumption of an open trial. However, argu-
ments against this presumption have arisen because of the press' impact
on the accused's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.7 De-
fendants no longer desire public trials. Instead they plead for closed pro-
ceedings in hopes of getting a fair and impartial trial untainted by the
press.
Despite defendants' desires, courts have consistently accorded more
weight to the press and have moved from a rebuttable presumption of
openness to a conclusive presumption of openness.' In New York Times
Co. v. Demakos,9 ("Demakos") the court addressed the issue of media
access to plea proceedings and determined that the media should be al-
lowed access to both pre-trial and trial proceedings.' 0 The court stated
closed proceedings were permissible only in rare instances where the de-
fendant presented clear and compelling evidence for closure.'1 The
Demakos decision, in conjunction with decisions in other circuits, illus-
trates how the press' first amendment right of access can impede the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to invoke closure. 2 However, in order
to maintain public respect for the judicial process and public confidence
in the integrity of the judicial system, closed proceedings should not be
allowed. To permit otherwise will diminish the public's perception that
justice has been done.
5. [T]he right of a defendant to a fair trial and the first amendment guarantees of
free speech and a free press... are not essentially in conflict. They are parallel and
complementary .... Judges, like other normal human beings, find power delightful
... but our system of government was designed to prevent any public official from
experiencing the reality of that pleasure. That is why judges, who interpret the Con-
stitution, are also bound by its commands.
L.A. Times, June 1, 1971, § IV (Editorial) at 8, col. 1-2.
6. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573. J. Burger concluded that the presumption of
open trials is inherent in the nature of criminal trials conducted in the United States.
7. "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. For definition and analysis of presumption of openness, see Historical Overview infra
p. 223.
9. 137 A.D.2d 247, 529 N.Y.S.2d 97 (A.D.2d Dept. 1988).
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id. at 100.




In December, 1986, a group of white youths attacked three black
men in Howard Beach, Queens County, New York. One black man, age
twenty-three, was chased onto an expressway where he was hit by a pass-
ing car and killed. The other black men were chased through the streets
of Howard Beach and beaten with clubs.
Three of the youths involved were convicted of second degree man-
slaughter. A trial of the remaining seven defendants was scheduled to
begin in May, 1988. A New York Times ("Times") reporter heard ru-
mors that two of the defendants, Harry Buonocore and Salvatore
DeSimone, were secretly negotiating with the prosecution and Judge
Demakos ("Judge") to plead guilty to charges of riotII in the first degree.
When the reporter attempted to confirm the rumors, he was con-
fronted with a gag order 4 barring all comment to the press on the plea
bargain."5 The Times contacted Judge Demakos requesting an opportu-
nity to gain access to the plea proceedings or to be heard on the issue of
the closure of the proceedings. 6 Judge Demakos refused to hold a clo-
sure hearing and thereafter one of the defendants pled guilty in the
Judge's chambers with the press and public excluded. 7 The Judge or-
dered the proceeding transcript sealed, further precluding press access.18
The Times sought a temporary restraining order to halt Judge Demakos
from conducting any more closed plea proceedings and to direct him to
disclose the transcript of defendant Buonocore's plea proceeding. As a
result, the Times was given an opportunity to protest closure of defend-
ant Buonocore's plea proceeding prior to defendant DeSimone's plea.' 9
Judge Demakos denied the Times' request for both access to future plea
13. Riot means:
a public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons
part of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a
clear and present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any
other person or to the person of any other individual; or (2) a threat or threats of the
commission of an act or acts of violence by one more persons part of an assemblage
of three or more persons having, individually or collectively, the ability of immediate
execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of the threatened act or
acts of violence would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would result in,
damage or injury to the property of any other person or the person of any other
individual. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2102(a) (West 1984).
14. A gag order is an action taken by a court in a trial with a great deal of notoriety,
ordering the attorneys and witnesses not to discuss the case with reporters - in order to assure
the defendant a fair trial. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (5th ed. 1979).
15. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id.
1990]
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proceedings of defendant DeSimone and for disclosure of the transcript
of defendant Buonocore's plea proceeding.2" He stated that the remain-
ing defendants' rights to a fair and impartial jury trial could not be pro-
tected because of the extensive media publicity surrounding the case.2
The Judge based his decision on the unique nature of the case and the
prejudicial effect of any pretrial publicity on the remaining five defend-
ants' rights to a fair and impartial jury.22 Additionally, he denied any
possible alternatives to closure.23 The Times then commenced proceed-
ings against Judge Demakos to prohibit him from conducting closed plea
proceedings and to compel him to disclose the transcript of any prior
closed plea proceedings.24
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Demakos, the New York Supreme Court held that Judge
Demakos improperly closed the plea proceedings25 because the necessity
for closing the proceedings was not sufficiently demonstrated to outweigh
the constitutional right of public and press access. 26 The court empha-
sized the presumption of openness in trials and pre-trial hearings 27 and
stated that open court proceedings "protect the accused from secret in-
quisitional techniques and unjust prosecution ... [and] instill a sense of
public trust in our judicial process."' 28 The court further noted that the
public and media's right of access extended to pre-trial hearings in crimi-
nal cases 29 and reasoned that secret proceedings would frustrate the pub-
lic because the open courtroom forum provides a necessary outlet for
20. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
21. Id.
22. Transcript In the Matter of the Proceedings With Respect to: Special Proceeding
Number 8792 at 21, New York Times Co. v. Demakos, 137 A.D.2d 247, 529 N.Y.S.2d 97
(A.D.2d Dept. 1988).
23. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966). Alternatives to clo-
sure would be extensive voir dire to screen out prejudiced jurors, change in venue, postpone-
ment of trial, and sequestration of jurors.
24. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
25. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 101.
27. The court stated that federal and state constitutions and a line of prior decisions advo-
cate such a presumption. Id. at 99.
28. Id. at 99-100.
29. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986);
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Matter of Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 510
N.E.2d 313, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1987) (access to pretrial hearings permitted); Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (extended access to voir dire proceedings); and
Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 409 N.E.2d 876, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1980)




The New York Supreme Court qualified its holding by providing for
closure in rare instances.3' Thus, closed proceedings may be held when
specific factual findings clearly outweigh the presumption of openness.32
In addition, the trial judge must provide the interested parties with an
opportunity to contest closure prior to making a decision.
33
Applying the New York Supreme Court standard, the court held
that Judge Demakos' gag order was improper because he failed to sup-
port his determination with specific factual findings and did not provide
the interested parties with an opportunity to contest closure prior to the
first defendant's plea proceeding.34 The court determined that Judge
Demakos' findings that closure and a sealed plea transcript were neces-
sary to protect the remaining defendants' right to a fair trial were hypo-
thetical and unwarranted.35 Judge Demakos conceded that despite the
extensive media coverage that preceded the first Howard Beach trial, he
had been able to empanel a fair and impartial jury 6 through careful voir
dire.37 The court held that the "potentially prejudicial effect which the
public disclosure of the instant plea proceedings would have ... [can be]
no greater than that which occurred from the [earlier pre-trial] public-
ity."'3' The court noted that witnesses' observations and their testimony
in the preceding trial were included in the newspapers.39 The court
stated that the categorical exclusion of the press was not warranted
30. Id. at 100 (citing Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 508-09) (An open trial can have a
"community therapeutic value" in that public proceedings can "vindicate the concerns of the
victims and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for their
criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.").
31. Id. at 100.
32. Id. The decision for closure must be supported by specific factual findings and not
conclusory assertions.
33. Id. The court set forth the standard for closure as it was articulated in Press-Enterprise
Co., 464 U.S. at 510. "The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered."
34. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
35. Id. (citing the argument set forth and rejected in Matter of Associated Press v. Bell, 70
N.Y.2d 32, 510 N.E.2d 313 (1987), 517 N.Y.S.2d 444. Bell involved the closure of the Hunt-
ley hearing in the widely publicized murder trial of Robert Chambers.).
36. Id.
37. This phrase denotes the preliminary examination which the court may make of one
presented as a witness or juror, where his competency, interest, etc., is objected to. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979).
38. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
39. Id. The Howard Beach tragedy was set in a context of racism not limited to the How-
ard Beach area but widespread all over urban America. Economic shifts, crime and disintegra-
tion of neighborhoods which feed racist fears and reactions provided the setting for the tragic
1990]
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where the defendants were already front page news. 4° Categorical exclu-
sion could lead to speculative news which would be more damaging to
the defendants than first hand press coverage. 4' The court reprimanded
Judge Demakos for his "subjective whims"42 which had made the rights
of the press under the first amendment a hostage in this case,43 and
granted the Times' petition for disclosure of defendant Buonocore's plea
proceedings transcript."
IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS
Two factors must be considered in cases dealing with the press' first
amendment right of access and the accused's sixth amendment right to a
public trial. The first consideration is whether the place and process has
historically been open to the press and the public.45 The second consid-
eration is whether public access occupies a significant positive role in the
functioning of the process.46
A. Media Access to Public Trials
The right of the accused to an open and public trial was guaranteed
with the passage of the sixth amendment.47 Neither the Constitution nor
the Bill of Rights however contain an explicit provision guaranteeing the
public access to criminal trials.48 Hence, the media's access right, as a
surrogate for the public,49 must be found elsewhere.
1. Historical Look at Media Access
Criminal trials have historically been open to the public dating back
to the Norman Conquest of England.50 When a lack of discipline in the
events which generated extensive publicity. "Howard Beach: Judged and Prejudged," N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1987, at 20, col. I (city ed.).
40. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
41. Id. At least one defense attorney voiced strong opposition to the closed proceedings
because of a concern of prejudice to his client of speculative media reports of the closed
proceedings.
42. Id. at 102.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
49. Id. at 572 (citing 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 436 (1976)).
50. Prior to the Norman Conquest, cases in England were brought before moots and at-
tended to by the freemen of the town acting in the capacity of jurors. See generally Richmond
[Vol. 10
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courtroom created disrespect for the judicial system early courts resolved
the problem by prescribing rules for courtroom conduct, but avoided
closure.5
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,5 2 ("Gannett") the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the public had an in-
dependent constitutional right of access to pre-trial judicial proceedings.
In Gannett, the press claimed a sixth amendment right of access to a pre-
trial evidence suppression hearing. 3 The Court limited the sixth amend-
ment guarantee to the defendant as a personal right,54 but indicated that
the first amendment might provide the press with access to criminal pro-
ceedings. 5 Initially, the majority distinguished between pre-trial pro-
ceedings and the actual trial, stressing that pre-trial publicity might have
a prejudicial impact on potential jurors and that the sixth amendment
did not grant the public a right to attend pre-trial hearings.6 However,
in stating the holding the majority concluded that the public had no right
to attend criminal trials under the sixth amendment and abandoned the
distinction between pre-trial and trial proceedings. 7 Obviously, the
scope of the holding was unclear. The court left unanswered the ques-
tion of whether public access to criminal trials was guaranteed by the
first amendment. The media criticized the Gannett holding because the
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565-75 (elaborate history of the criminal trial). A moot refers to the
local court or the county court. Id. at 565. Presumably, inherent risks existed in a town-
meeting trial; the risk that the gathering might be moved by emotions or passions emanating
from the nature of the crime. A lynch mob atmosphere is hardly the setting for reasoned
decision-making based on evidence. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478
U.S. 1 (1986). After the Norman Conquest, although the duty of the freeman was no longer
compulsory, criminal trials presumably remained open as there is no evidence to the contrary.
448 U.S. at 565. However, the King desired open trials so that the community could aid in the
punishment of evildoers and establish a certain peace for the welfare of the realm and of the
people. Over the centuries, although the procedural aspects of the criminal system evolved,
the public character of the trial remained constant. Id. at 566.
51. 448 U.S. at 567.
52. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
53. Defendants were accused of second-degree murder, robbery and grand larceny. De-
fendants moved to suppress involuntary statements allegedly made to police as well as physical
evidence seized during the arrest. The press was excluded from the hearing to avoid publicity.
Id. at 374-75.
54. Id. at 387. (Stewart, J.) ("[b]y the time of the adoption of the Constitution, public
trials were clearly associated with the protection of the defendant.").
55. Id. at 391-92. J. Stewart declined to decide in the abstract whether this right does exist
-in the first amendment. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, however, did find a right of
access in the first amendment. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. See generally 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
57. Id. at 391. Chief Justice Burger, noticing the ambiguity in Justice Stewart's language,
stressed in his concurring opinion that the scope of Gannett is limited to pre-trial hearings, Id.
at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1990]
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decision led to a rash of courtroom closures throughout the nation with-
out due regard for the public interest.5"
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,59 the Court limited its
holding in Gannett' to pre-trial proceedings. The Court ruled that the
first amendment affords the press a protected right of access to criminal
trials.6' The first amendment assures that courtroom proceedings are
communicated to the public through the media,62 thereby prohibiting the
government from arbitrarily closing the courtroom doors.6 3 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, in a concurring opinion, stressed that although the sixth
amendment does not extend courtroom access to the press at criminal
trials,' 4 the first amendment gives the public a right to access in criminal
trials absent an overriding interest.65 Burger reasoned that the first
amendment guarantees the right to receive information, as well as the
right to speak or take action in public places.66 The right to assemble, as
an explicit guarantee of the first amendment, "is a right cognate to those
of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental."67 Such a right
may be exercised in any public place for a "lawful purpose."68 Burger
further stated that the courtroom is a public place where people have a
right to assemble "to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
place."69 Consequently, the media, acting as an agent of the public, in-
herits the same right.7° Thus, the sixth amendment explicitly grants de-
fendants the right to a public trial,7 but the press can gain access under
58. See Schmidt, The Gannett Decision: A Contradiction Wrapped In An Obfuscation In-
side An Enigma, The Judge's Journal 13 (Fall 1979).
59. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The case involved the fourth trial for a murder charge. The
defendant moved for the exclusion of the public from the courtroom because he feared that a
family member of the victim may inform potential witnesses of prior witness testimony.
60. 443 U.S. at 391.
61. 448 U.S. at 575-81.
62. Id. at 575.
63. Courts have stated that the first amendment should be read within the broadest scope
that the context of society will permit. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (citing
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)). The right to speak and publish events that
occur at a criminal trial would lose much substance if access to observe the criminal trial could
be foreclosed arbitrarily. 448 U.S. at 577, n.12.
64. Id. at 564-69.
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 578.
67. Id.
68. 448 U.S. at 578 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939)).
69. Id., see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-65 (1941).
70. 488 U.S. at 576 ("An expansion of the freedom to assembly includes access for the
public, and the media acting as agents of the public... [Without some] protection for seeking
out the news freedom of the press ... could be eviscerated.").
71. The sixth amendment guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy




B. Media Access to Non-Trial Proceedings
It has of course, long been the law.., that all judicial proceed-
ings, both civil and criminal, are presumptively open to the
public 73 and that a proceeding at which a criminal defendant
enters a plea of guilty is indisputedly a substitute for a trial.74
There was no right to attend pre-trial proceedings at common law.75
After the abolition of the Star Chamber 76 in 1641, defendants acquired
rights akin to those embodied in the sixth amendment. 77 However, pre-
trial proceedings were not granted the same degree of openness for fear
of prejudice and bias resulting in an unfair trial.78 Allowing the press
368 (1979) (only the criminal defendant, not the public or the press, may use the sixth amend-
ment to challenge courtroom closure).
72. In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d at 388 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81
(1980); and In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir. 1984)).
73. Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 103 N.E. 155 (1913).
74. People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N.Y. 27, 35 N.E.2d 636 (1941).
75. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387, 389. See, e.g., E. Jenks, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75
(6th ed. 1967) ("It must, of course, be remembered, that the principle of publicity only applies
to the actual trial of a case, not necessarily to the preliminary or prefatory stages of the pro-
ceeding ....").
76. The Star Chamber was a court which originally had jurisdiction in cases where the
ordinary course of justice was so obstructed by one party, through writs, combination of main-
tenance, or overawing influence that no inferior court would find its process obeyed. The court
consisted of the privy council, the common-law judges and all peers of Parliament. In the
reign of Henry VIII and his successors, the jurisdiction of the court was illegally extended to
such a degree (especially in punishing disobedience to the king's arbitrary proclamations) that
it became odious to the nation and it was abolished. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed.
1979).
77. 443 U.S. at 387, n.18.
78. Id. at 388. In the original New York Field Code of Criminal Procedure published in
1850, it was provided that pre-trial hearings should be closed to the public upon the request of
the defendant to protect the defendants from prejudicial pre-trial publicity. 443 U.S. at 390.
See COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 202
(Final Report 1850). The belief in the danger of open pre-trial proceedings was soon obliter-
ated prior to the trial of Aaron Burr for treason in 1807 where a probable cause hearing was
held. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986). See United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 1 (CC Va. 1807) (No. 14,692). The fact that the courtroom was too small to
accommodate the crush of interested citizens in the Burr hearing supports the evolution of the
belief that pretrial proceedings should not be closed.
Although the drafters of the Constitution could not envision the modern day exclusionary
rules and pretrial proceedings, the sixth amendment was drafted when written interrogatories
of pretrial litigation were in existence. 443 U.S. at 395-96. Thus, the drafters were aware that
some testimony may be recorded prior to the actual trial. However, that did not suggest that
the public had a right to be present at pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 396.
19901
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access to criminal pre-trial proceedings is a relatively new and limited
phenomenon.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,79 ("Press-Enterprise I")
the United States Supreme Court indicated that the first amendment
right of access also extends to some pre-trial proceedings. In that case,
the Court allowed the press access to voir dire proceedings, 80 treating
voir dire as part of the trial. Consequently, subsequent courts were un-
certain whether the first amendment right could be extended to pre-trial
proceedings that were not a part of the trial.81 The uncertainty was re-
solved two years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 82 ("Press-
Enterprise II") where the California Supreme Court held that the media
has a first amendment right of access to the transcripts of a preliminary
hearing.83
Subsequent decisions have found a first amendment right of access
in a variety of pre-trial proceedings.84 In In re Washington Post Co.,"
the Fourth Circuit held that the press had a first amendment right of
access to plea and sentencing proceedings and to documents filed in con-
nection with the hearing.86 The court reasoned that the taking of a plea
served as a "substitute for trial"87 and should be treated the same as a
trial for first amendment purposes. 88 The court further held that even if
plea proceedings could not be viewed as a part of the actual trial, "they
are.., as much an integral part of a criminal prosecution as are prelimi-
nary probable-cause hearings, suppression . . . or bail hearings, all of
which have been held to be subject to the public's first amendment right
of access.",
89
Other courts have held that a preliminary hearing is comparable to a
trial since it provides the "sole occasion for public observation of the
79. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., In re Application of the Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1984).
82. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
83. In Press-Enterprise II, the state of California commenced prosecution of Robert Diaz,
a nurse, who allegedly murdered twelve patients by administering massive doses of lidocaine.
478 U.S. 1, 3.
84. See, e.g., In re Application of the Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d
550, 554-57 (3d Cir. 1982).
85. 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
86. Id. The case involved a newspaper that moved to obtain release of the transcript of a
plea hearing in connection with espionage charges against an alien and to obtain the right to
participate in future hearings.





criminal justice system" 9 and is often the final determination of a crimi-
nal case.9 '
C. The Role of Access in the Criminal Justice System
Public access has played a significant role in the functioning of the
criminal justice system.9 2 Open criminal trials not only protect the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial by a fair and impartial
jury,9 3 but also protect the judiciary from extensive criticism because the
public is allowed to supervise and participate in the prosecution.94 The
presence of the public operates to check any temptation that might be felt
by either the prosecutor or the court to obtain a guilty plea by coercion
or trick, or to seek or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate sentence. 95
An adequately informed public can resort to extra-judicial reform meas-
ures through public discussion and political pressure. 96
The first amendment embodies many values and several interpreta-
tions as to what is included within the protection of "free press." 97 Re-
porting on the criminal justice system is at the core of first amendment
90. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).
91. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984).
92. See generally Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
ior Court, etc., 457 U.S. 596, (1982); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501; see also Historical
Overview supra at 220.
93. The defendant is guaranteed a fair trial by the due process clause of both the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
94. Open trials help to maintain or increase public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1959) (right to a public trial reflects
the common law concept that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice").
95. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389.
96. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial
Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1908 n.45 (1978) (public discussion of the Watergate
affair resulted in legislative reforms of campaign practices).
97. The objective of constitutional protection for freedom of the press was explicitly an-
nounced as early as 1774 in a letter from the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of
Quebec:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of
this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science and morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of the government,
its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promo-
tion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated,
into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs. 1 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774).
Our Founding Fathers were businessmen who wanted social order but wanted to minimize
government intrusion into their business affairs. Their ideology is represented in the first
amendment which provides a forum for the interchange of political and social ideas for pro-
moting socially desirable changes. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The
first amendment assures the people freedom of communication regarding governmental
functions.
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
values.98 Secrecy diminishes the public's perception that justice is being
done. As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart."99 "[The] [s]ecrecy of judicial action can only
breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the com-
petence and impartiality of judges .... [F]ree and robust reporting...
[will] improve the quality of [the criminal justice] system by subjecting it
to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability."'"
Closed courtrooms are dangerous as public respect for the judicial
process will erode if long awaited criminal prosecutions are concluded
behind closed doors. Open courtrooms enhance the "community thera-
peutic value 1°' of openness,"' 2 because an outlet for public reactions and
emotions resulting from criminal acts is provided.
V. THE CONFLICT
Free Speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished poli-
cies of our civilization and it would be a trying task to choose
between them. 1
03
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." 0 Although the
public's right to attend criminal trials is not explicit in the Constitu-
tion, 105 courts have recognized that public access is necessary to the en-
joyment of explicitly defined rights"0 6 and have further held that the
right to an open public trial is a right shared by the public and the ac-
cused; the assurance of fairness is the common ground. 107
98. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 586. Other justifications for an open trial include the improved quality of testi-
mony, unknown witnesses are possibly induced to come forward to testify and trial partici-
pants will perform their duties more conscientously. See Gannett Co. Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (public trial ensures duties performed
responsibly, discourages perjury due to fear of embarrassment).
101. An open process of justice serves a prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for com-
munity concern, hostility and emotion. It is important that society's criminal process satisfy
the appearance of justice and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people
to observe it. Early history of open trials reflects that people sensed from experience and
observation that the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public
acceptance of both the process and its results. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72.
102. Press-Enterprise I1, 478 U.S. at 13.
103. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
105. Although the sixth amendment grants an accused the right to a speedy and public trial
it does not grant such a right to the public. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. See generally Historical Overview, supra, at 220.
107. Press-Enterprise I1, 478 U.S. 1.
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The sixth amendment grants criminal defendants the right to a pub-
lic trial."08 This guarantees that the government will conduct the trial in
a fair manner. However, where the open trial interferes with a defend-
ant's ability to obtain a fair trial, a tension between the two constitutional
provisions results. 9 In Nebraska Press,"' the Supreme Court held that
"the Bill of Rights did not.., assign priorities between First Amend-
ment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
other.""' Thus, the Court was forced to reconcile the competing inter-
ests. The Court created a framework for balancing the rights of the ac-
cused and the rights of the media.
In Nebraska Press, several press and broadcast associations, publish-
ers, and reporters challenged the validity of a judicial order which re-
strained the media from publicizing any of the defendant's admissions to
law enforcement officials." 2 The Court held that the order was an un-
constitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press" 3 and would
not be tolerated by the Court. The Court found that prior to issuing a
restrictive order a judge must consider "(a) [the] nature and extent of
pre-trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (c) how effec-
tively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened dan-
ger.""' 4 The Court noted that "prior restraint[s] [have] an immediate
and irreversible sanction [which] freezes [speech] at least for a time."'' 5
However, the Court limited its discussion to public disclosure of admis-
sions and did not consider the issue of closed trials or pretrial hearings.
The Court's failure to address the issue prompted lower courts to substi-
108. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth
amendment public trial guarantee has been interpreted on various occasions. See, e.g., Gan-
nett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (only the criminal defendant, not the public or the
press, may use the sixth amendment to challenge courtroom closure); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 538 (1965) (the sixth amendment is a guarantee of the accused).
109. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
110. Id. at 561.
111. The case arose at a time when the courts encountered the media's increasing presence
in the courtrooms which subjected the defendant to be convicted by a partial jury. The influ-
ence and the reach of the media biased jurors and convictions were overturned when the de-
fense demonstrated that publicity had prejudiced the defense. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 541-42 (1965) (the presence of television cameras and reporters, over defendant's objec-
tions, deprived the defendant of due process. Reporters could be present in the courtroom
only in a nonobtrusive manner. The court held that a showing of inherent prejudice would
merit reversal.).
112. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539, 543.
113. Id. at 570.
114. Id. at 562.
115. Id. at 559.
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tute closure orders for gag orders. 1 6 Consequently, sixth amendment
guarantees infringed upon first amendment privileges because defendants
were granted their requests for closure. This proved detrimental to the
public because the media was kept out of the proceedings and was unable
to provide accurate reports to the public.
VI. ANALYSIS
The right of media access to criminal trials encompasses plea hear-
ings because a plea serves as a substitute"' for and is the legal and practi-
cal equivalent of the trial.' While it is possible that an open pre-trial
hearing may disclose evidence to potential jurors, the possibility of a de-
fendant's rights being impaired by the press and the public's access is
almost minimal." 9 However, there are instances where pretrial publicity
may effectively destroy the accused's right to a fair trial.'20 In Demakos,
Judge Demakos was concerned with the remaining defendants' rights to
fair and impartial trials. It is possible that a pleading defendant may
implicate the remaining defendants, and thus influence their right to an
impartial trial. However, courts have held that the mere fact that the
pleading defendant may implicate his co-defendants is insufficient to war-
rant closure.' 2 ' It is true that statements implicating the co-defendants
are prejudicial; however, all evidence which suggests guilt is highly prej-
udicial. This does not mean that all inculpatory evidence 22 must be en-
joined from pre-trial disclosure. 23 There is no basis for the rationale
that closure is necessary because the damaging evidence may prove to be
inadmissible at trial. It is unlikely that the evidence uncovered at a plea
hearing would be inadmissible at the later trial of a co-defendant because
more often than not, the defendant who pled guilty will testify at the co-
defendant's trial.'24 In Demakos, the court recognized that open plea
proceedings could not prejudice the remaining defendants and that cate-
gorical denial of access could not be justified.' 25
Additionally, the public's presence hinders temptation by the prose-
116. Id. at 564 n.8, 576 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986).
118. Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 725, 409 N.E.2d 876, 885, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400,
409 (1980) (dissenting opinion).
119. 50 N.Y.2d at 727, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
120. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
121. Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 727, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
122. Evidence tending to show a person's involvement in a crime; incriminating evidence.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (5th ed. 1979).
123. 50 N.Y.2d at 727, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
124. Id. 431 N.Y.S. 2d at 411.
125. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
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cution or the court to coerce a plea or to impose a disproportionate sen-
tence.1 26 Furthermore, access to plea proceedings substantially enhances
public discussion and knowledge of the criminal justice system.127 The
Demakos court accurately held that open criminal proceedings have a
community therapeutic value because "public proceedings vindicate the
concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are
being brought to account."'
128
A. Judicial Requirements for Closure
The court in Press-Enterprise I articulated the standard for closure:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered.
129
The closure standard has the practical effect of allowing press access
to pre-trial or trial criminal proceedings in all but rare circumstances.
The burden of sustaining a closure order is difficult, since "the primacy
of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in
the community to attend . ".1.."I30 The interest that may override the
presumption in favor of open trials is a compelling state interest,1 31 such
as the government's interest in avoiding the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation, 32 which can be preserved by the most narrowly tailored means
of closure.
The Demakos court properly applied this standard and held that the
presumption of openness of trials had not been overcome by a factual
showing of a compelling state interest sufficient to outweigh the constitu-
tional right of public and press access.13 3 Further, the court found it
significant that Judge Demakos refused to provide an opportunity for the
interested parties to be heard on the issue of closure134 and did not make
126. Washington Post, 807 F.2d at 389.
127. In re Application of the Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (1984).
128. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
129. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
130. Id. at 508.
131. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (compelling state interest required
for state circumscription of first amendment rights); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979) (highest form of state interest required for prior restraints).
132. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
133. Id. at 101.
134. Id.
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any specific findings to support his conclusion that closure was neces-
sary. "'35 Furthermore, even if Judge Demakos' articulated purpose was
justifiable, closure was not the means most narrowly tailored to serve
that purpose since other less intrusive alternatives were only summarily
determined to be not viable. The Judge's determination of nonviable al-
ternatives consisted of conclusory statements lacking any factual basis.' 36
B. Pre- Trial/Trial Distinction
The Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise I seemed to move the analy-
sis of closure away from the pre-trial/trial distinction.' 37 Instead, the
Court focused on first amendment values and the historical backdrop
against which the first amendment was enacted.'3 The Court found the
distinction between pre-trial and trial proceedings not dispositive in eval-
uating first amendment issues.' 39 Hence, the public's right to access pro-
ceedings is no longer dependent upon the proceeding's similarity to a
trial. Although the Demakos court did not address this issue, even if the
distinction between pre-trial/trial proceedings was considered relevant
by the court, the similarity of a plea hearing to a trial would be indicative
of it being presumptively open.'40
C. The Press as an Additional Check on the Three
Branches of Government
The press acts as an additional check on the three official branches
of government. In Myers v. United States,'4 ' Justice Brandeis wrote:
"[In setting up the three branches of government the Founders'] purpose
was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments,
to save the people from autocracy."' 4 2 The purpose of a constitutional
guarantee of a free press was to create a fourth institution to function as
an additional check on the three official branches."'
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in compari-
son of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recor-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 99.
137. 464 U.S. at 821-24.
138. Id. at 517.
139. Id. at 516.
140. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572; In re Washington Post Co., 807
F.2d 383, 389.
141. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
142. Id.
143. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
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dation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present
themselves in the character of checks, would be found to oper-
ate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks
only in appearance."
The Demakos court recognized that open court proceedings serve
several purposes, the most important of which is the perception that jus-
tice is being done. 145 Access to criminal proceedings further serves to
protect the accused from "secret inquisitional techniques and unjust per-
secution by public officials." '146 Hence, the Demakos court correctly af-
forded the press its first amendment right of access and harshly
reprimanded Judge Demakos for abridging the freedom of the press.
147
However, the result of the Demakos opinion is still troublesome because
even with the release of defendant Buonocore's plea transcript, questions
will linger as to whether the "whole story" has in fact been revealed.
Perhaps some aspect of the plea proceedings was kept off the record for
purposes of evading review and criticism or perhaps the plea was coerced
by the court. Although subsequent media coverage will pacify the pub-
lic's curiosity as to what occurred behind closed courtroom doors, se-
crecy at the outset will tarnish the public's perception that justice is being
done.
D. The Elimination of an Independent Press
Although the press has at times been abusive and untruthful,' 48 the
elimination of an independent press is not the way to eliminate abusive-
ness and untruthfulness. 49 Alternatives have been suggested, however,
on ways to keep the press in check. One alternative, suggested by a com-
mentator, is to subject the press to regulations within the limits of a con-
stitutional guarantee of free speech and require it to promote government
policy or current notions of social justice.15° Another alternative is to
eliminate an autonomous press altogether and to rely on the traditional
competition between the three branches of government, supplemented by
vigorous political activity for an adequate flow of information between
144. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. See I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 524 (1827). Bentham also emphasized that open proceedings enhanced the per-
formance of all involved, protected the judge from imputations of dishonesty, and served to
educate the public. Id. at 525.
145. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
146. Id. at 99-100.
147. Id. at 101.
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the people and their representatives and for a sufficient check on autoc-
racy and despotism."' However, it is clear that the Founders did not
intend to subject the press to such regulations because they doubted that
personal liberties would survive without an independent press."5 2
In Demakos, the court recognized that the presence of the press is
guaranteed by both the United States and state Constitutions'53 and held
that press access assures the innocent that justice is being done, and im-
poses the power of the law on the guilty.' 54
Limiting media access to pre-trial proceedings has had very little
practical effect. The barriers to closed proceedings are often penetrated
by reporters through second-hand sources or informers.' 55 Much of
what the court seeks to keep from public discussion is already in the
public domain either through reports of prior proceedings or through
witness' accounts of the events. For example, in Demakos, Judge
Demakos was unable to articulate how any current news reports would
detrimentally increase the extensive public knowledge about the case.'5 6
The Demakos trial was preceded by the initial Howard Beach trial
which, after three and one half months of front page coverage, resulted in
the conviction of three defendants for manslaughter.' 57 Hence, no mat-
ter how stringently closure is applied, dissemination of the information to
the public will still result.
E. Conclusive Presumption of Openness
Although Demakos is a state decision, it is one of the first cases to
explicitly adhere to a conclusive presumption of openness in press access
cases.' 58 Compelling circumstances that may warrant closure are diffi-
cult to articulate. The Demakos court increased the stringency of the
standard for closure by stating that closure may be granted only in rare
circumstances which clearly and compellingly outweigh the value of
openness.' 59 In conjunction with other decisions, the Demakos court
151. Id.
152. Id. at 637.
153. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
154. Id. at 100.
155. In Demakos the court discusses at length the extensive coverage of the prior trials
which included the witness' accounts and observations. Id. at 101. One defense attorney also
objected to closed sessions for fear of speculative media reports. See also Fried, Howard Beach
Judge Negotiating Plea Deals, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1988, at B7 (the news of the plea bargain
was news prior to its finality).
156. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
157. See supra, Facts at 216.
158. See also Capital Newspapers v. Lee, 15 Med. L. Rptr. 1669 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
159. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
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tipped the scale in favor of the press and provided the press with an
additional cushion to fall upon in the case of a defendant who requests
closure.
F Alternatives to Closure
Protective measures are available to protect the defendant without
closing the proceeding. The purpose of such protective measures is to
ensure that the trial outcome is based solely on evidence produced at
trial, and not on inadmissible information communicated to the jury
through the media." °
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 6 ' the country's highest court suggested
many ways the judiciary could protect the rights of the accused. Some of
the suggested protections include limiting the number of newsmen al-
lowed in the courtroom, closely supervising courtroom conduct, insulat-
ing witnesses, and controlling the release of leads, information and gossip
to the press by police officers, witnesses and counsel. 162 To prevent prej-
udice, a closure order should not be entered until all possible alternatives,
including but not limited to a change of venue, continuance, sequestra-
tion of the jury and an adequate number of pre-emptory challenges, are
explored. 
6 3
In Demakos, Judge Demakos found that a proper voir dire would
not cure the prejudicial effect of pre-trial publicity because the case had
received such extensive publicity. He further determined that question-
ing each juror about the events surrounding the Howard Beach tragedy
would produce no protection for the remaining defendants because each
juror who resided in New York City had presumably heard something
about the highly publicized Howard Beach case and thus had formed an
opinion."6 Similarly, the trial could not be adjourned because some de-
fendants had made motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds; and a
change of venue was not viable because there was no place in the State of
New York where residents had not heard of, or would not hear of, the
case. 165 The appellate court held that these findings did not support clo-
sure because Judge Demakos conceded that he was able to impanel an
160. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
161. Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333, 358-62.
162. Id.
163. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64.
164. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
165. See Respondent Justice Demakos' Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's
Cross Motion to Dismiss the Petition, New York Times Co. v. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d 97
(A.D. 2d Dept. 1988).
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impartial jury even after the extensive publicity of the first Howard
Beach trial.166
The opinion of the appellate court was correct since the standard for
closure requires that the means chosen to serve a compelling interest
must be narrowly tailored. Since other alternatives would similarly serve
the compelling interest of obtaining a fair trial, Judge Demakos failed to
satisfy the means prong of the standard.
G. Chaos in the Courtrooms
Newspapers and journalists have been regarded as the handmaidens
of effective judicial administration in the criminal field.167 In cases where
the press' access is challenged, appellate courts often admonish the trial
court judge for not taking proper measures to avoid the carnival atmos-
phere that pervaded at trial.16' As long as the press does not provide
pure entertainment for its readers by engaging in abusive, untruthful or
inflated news coverage, but rather provides accurate, thorough and re-
sponsible news reporting, the defendant will benefit. Truthful reporting
may generate sympathy from the public for the defendant and ease the
concerns of defense attorneys about prejudice to their clients because of
partial reports. 169 Incomplete news accounts of criminal proceedings do
not serve any interests and do not help to impanel an impartial jury.
Furthermore, courts have found that open trials produce evidence which
might otherwise not have been discovered in a closed proceeding.17°
Yet, despite the clear benefits of open trials, press access to pretrial
proceedings and to the actual trial has generated extensive criticism.
Although Justice Stewart's concept of "press autonomy" indicates that
the government can neither "intrude on the newsgathering, publishing or
disseminating functions of the press nor grant special privileges to the
press which might ultimately undermine its independence,"171 the press
has been permitted a free hand within the broadest scope possible with-
out threatening the integrity of the trial.'72 In Nebraska Press, Justice
Brennan stated: [T]here can be no prohibition on the publication by the
press of any information pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or
166. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
167. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350. See also J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EvI-
DENCE 67 (1825) (publicity is "the soul of justice").
168. 384 U.S. at 358; Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.
169. 529 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Impliedly, partial or speculative coverage is not desired. The
defense would rather have thorough coverage so as to avoid unfavorable publicity.
170. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948).
171. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631-37 (1975).
172. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
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the operation of the criminal justice system, no matter how shabby the
means by which the information is obtained." '73 However, the bounda-
ries of a free hand give rise to those instances where courtroom access
impedes a defendant's right to get a fair trial.
For example, Sheppard 74 was a murder case which received exten-
sive national publicity. The press exploited the gruesome details of the
murder of Dr. Sheppard's pregnant wife. Essentially, the accused was
convicted and sentenced by the newspapers. 175 Although the trial judge
was aware of the excessive pre-trial publicity, he failed to take effective
steps to curtail the massive publicity or to eliminate the circus atmos-
phere of the trial. 176 A majority of the Supreme Court ordered the re-
lease of Dr. Sheppard from custody because the trial court failed to
invoke procedures to guarantee him a fair trial.177 The message in Shep-
pard was unmistakable: trial judges have a duty to take all steps neces-




Closure in the Demakos case would not have been effective for two
reasons. Though details were not known, news reports had already re-
vealed the existence of the plea agreements. 179 Further, no showing was
made that the public reporting of one defendant's plea agreement would
irreparably harm the ability of the other defendants to obtain a fair
trial. 180
The Demakos court did not deviate from the general rule expressed
by Justice Holmes over half a century ago: "The theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evi-
dence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
173. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 588. However, he asserted that such publication "does not
imply.., any subordination of Sixth Amendment rights, for an accused's right to a fair trial
may be adequately assured through methods that do not infringe First Amendment values."
174. 384 U.S. 333.
175. Id. at 335-42.
176. The jurors were subjected to newspaper, television and radio coverage of the trial while
not taking part in the proceedings. The jurors also received anonymous letters and phone
calls. Bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically
the entire courtroom hounding most of the participants in the trial. Id. at 352-55.
177. Id. at 358-62.
178. Id. at 362-63.
179. See Fried, Howard Beach Judge Negotiating Plea Deals, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1988, at
B7.
180. Affidavit of Petitioner at 9-10, New York Times Co. v. Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d 97
(A.D. 2d Dept. 1988).
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whether of private talk or public print." ' Open plea proceedings in
Demakos would not have induced undue outside influence; the sixth
amendment rights of the remaining defendants would not have been in-
fringed upon because the details of the Howard Beach murders had al-
ready received extensive coverage, from the date of the incident to the
date of the plea proceedings. The guilt or innocence of those defendants
would be established by whatever evidence was produced at their respec-
tive trials and not by public print.
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their in-
stitutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing.18 2 The press should not be curtailed but should be
warned of the impropriety of publishing material not introduced in the
proceedings, s3 and of the danger of publishing distorted material.
The Demakos court's analysis of press rights presents the trend of
the law today towards a conclusive presumption of openness in pre-trial,
trial and plea proceedings. Although compelling circumstances can
overcome the constitutional right of press and public access, the court
has indicated that protective measures other than closure are sufficient to
protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial trial. De-
spite a conclusive presumption of openness, closure orders will still be
issued and defendants will attempt to establish compelling interests suffi-
cient enough to overcome the presumption. However, it is clear that the
scale has been heavily tipped in favor of the press.
Eileen F. Tanielian*
181. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
182. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
183. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362.
* The author would like to thank her husband, Philip, for his support and
understanding.
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